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Ethnic Groups at ‘Critical Junctures’:
The Laz vs. Kurds
ZEKI SARIGIL
The Turkish Republic emerged onto the world stage as a secular and centralized
nation state in the early 1920s from the remnants of the multi-ethnic, multi-religious
and multi-lingual Ottoman Empire. The newly created nation state was established
on the bedrock of Turkish nationalism. However, there are numerous ethnic groups
in the country.1 Among these, the Kurds constitute the second largest ethnic group
after the Turks.2
Since its initiation, the Republic has encountered strong Kurdish ethnonational-
ism in both violent and peaceful forms. For instance, during the 1920s and 1930s, the
Republic was contested by several Kurdish revolts with strong ethnoreligious
elements. Major rebellions were: Shaykh Said (1925); Agrı (1930); and Dersim
(Tunceli) (1937–38).3 In the mid-1980s, an armed conﬂict emerged between the
security forces and the separatist PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party, Partiya Karkeren
Kurdistan). In the 1990s, the Kurdish movement led by the PKK became more
ethnonationalist and also much more violent. For instance, from 1984 to 1999 the
number of people killed is estimated to be more than 30,000 (half of them PKK
members, one-quarter civilians and one-quarter security members) and the cost of
ﬁghting during this period was hundreds of billions of dollars.4
Besides these violent formations and movements, the country has also witnessed
the founding and eventual closure of successive pro-Kurdish political parties
operating within the Turkish political system in the last two decades. The major ones
were the People’s Labour Party (HEP, 1990–93); the Democracy Party (DEP, 1993–
94); the People’s Democracy Party (HADEP, 1994–2003); the Democratic Society
Party (DTP, 2005–9). These parties were accused of involvement in separatist
activities and fomenting propaganda against the indivisible unity of the state’s
people and its territory and of helping the separatist PKK. As a result, they were
banned by the Constitutional Court.5
Although Kurdish ethnonationalism has been one of the biggest challenges to the
Turkish state and democracy in the last three decades,6 it is diﬃcult to observe any
similar movement within other groups such as the Laz, a distinct ethnic group of
Caucasian origin mostly living at the eastern end of Turkey’s Black Sea shore in the
coastal lowlands, especially in the provinces of Rize and Artvin. Large numbers of
the Laz also reside in western provinces such as Bolu, Bursa, Istanbul, Kocaeli,
Sakarya and Zonguldak and in Western Europe, especially in Germany.7
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It becomes even more puzzling that although one can observe the revival of
interest in Laz history, language and culture among Laz intellectuals and activists
in the last two decades, especially among those living in Istanbul, Ankara and
Germany, the Laz have never become embroiled in an ethnonationalist challenge
against the Turkish state. For instance, the Laz activists have initiated certain
periodicals in Lazuri such as Ogni (Istanbul, 1993–94), Mjora (2000), Skani Nena
(2009–) and established certain cultural and solidarity organizations or associations
such as Sima Dogu Karadenizliler Hizmet Vakfı (the Sima Foundation for People
from East Black Sea Region, Izmit, 1996–); Lazebura (Cologne, 1998–) and Laz
Ku¨ltu¨r Dernegi (the Laz Cultural Association, Istanbul, 2008–). The common
purpose of these activities has been stated as the preservation and promotion of the
Laz culture and language. Having such a goal, Laz activists have demanded
publishing and TV broadcasting in Lazuri and the restoration of certain Laz place
names.8
Several scholars conclude that this unprecedented activism should be treated as
a cultural revival rather than an ethnonationalist movement. Benninghaus, for
instance, observes that:
The feeling of being a separate ethnic group, which is based especially on the
awareness of speaking a language completely diﬀerent from Turkish, did not
lead the Laz into political or cultural opposition to the Turks as has apparently
been the case with many Kurds.9
Similarly, Beller-Hann and Hann, who conducted extensive ﬁeldwork in the region
between 1983 and 1999, conclude that ‘At present, few Lazi see themselves as
constituting an etnik grup [ethnic group]. They feel more strongly about other
belongings: to localities, to counties, to their country and to the universal community
of Islam.’10 With respect to Laz intellectuals, Aksamaz proclaims that ‘Laz
intellectuals and activists do not endorse/approve of ethnic nationalism, neither
do they sympathize with ethno-political organizations. However, they are sensitive
about the survival of their language and culture.’11
Evidence from the author’s interviews with several Laz activists and intellectuals
also shows the absence of ethnonationalist orientations among the Laz (see the
appendix for a list of interviewees). Almost all interviewed activists emphasize that
their eﬀorts at promoting Laz language and culture cannot be regarded as ethnic
mobilization or a type of ethnic nationalism. For instance, Gu¨lay Burhan, the
chairperson of SIMA, stated to the author that:
I would like to stress that our objective is to keep the Laz language and culture
alive. However, we are deﬁnitely against any ethnic nationalism or separatism.
The Laz people identify themselves primarily as Turks and secondarily as Laz.
They think that they are part of Turkey and they have a strong will to ﬁght for
the interests of the country.
Similarly, Mehmedali Baris Besli, the chairperson of the Laz Cultural Association,
indicated that ‘The Laz people view themselves as both Turks and Laz . . . Our
movement cannot be labelled as ethnonationalism. We are only concerned with the
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protection and promotion of the Laz language and culture.’ Likewise, Aytekin
Lokumcu from the Laz Cultural and Solidarity Association (Ankara) expressed that
‘We only care about our language and culture . . . We do not have any further
demands or needs such as education in Lazuri, the recognition of Lazuri as an oﬃcial
language, a political party or any type of autonomy or separation.’ Some Laz
activists even stated to the author that the demands for cultural rights such as
broadcasting in Lazuri are not really an issue for the majority of the Laz people.12
Thus, a certain degree of cultural revival initiated and promoted by the Laz
intellectuals and activists in the last decades does not change the fact that the Laz
have avoided engagement in an ethnonationalist challenge vis-a`-vis the Turkish
state. Rather, one can discern instead strong Turkish nationalism within the Laz
community. For instance, as Table 1 shows, the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetc¸i
Hareket Partisi, MHP) has been relatively more popular in the East Black Sea
region, compared to south-eastern Turkey inhabited mostly by the Kurds. This
provides further evidence for the weakness of ethnonationalist orientations among
the Laz.
In brief, even if certain sections of the Laz people are increasingly aware of their
distinct ethnic origins, language and culture, interestingly they tend to treat those
diﬀerences as something embedded within Turkishness. In other words, contrary to the
Kurdish case, any ethnic consciousness among the Laz does not cause the rejection of
Turkish identity or any tension with the Turkish state. As Hann observes:
if pressed, most will state that their language is not Turkish and must be related
to other languages of the Caucasus. But even those who do associate the
language clearly with the Caucasus do not necessarily see this as diminishing
their identity as Turks.13
Table 1. The electoral performance of the ultranationalist MHP in the Southeast and East
Black Sea regions.
Region Province 1995 (%) 1999 (%) 2002 (%) 2007 (%)
Southeast Diyarbakır 1.95 2.76 1.52 2.45
Van 7.14 8.04 3.21 3.24
Siirt 6.87 5.01 0 2.77
S¸anlıurfa 3.74 8.49 7.94 5.38
Mus¸ 5.85 4.36 3.09 2.31
Mardin 5.43 1.93 2.77 1.33
Hakkari 2.17 2.04 3.99 1.85
S¸ırnak 4.26 4.99 2.88 2.87
Batman 1.49 2.07 1.98 0.94
Bitlis 7.56 11.36 6.44 5.73
Regional Average 4.65 5.11 3.38 2.89
East Black Sea Trabzon 7.72 21.91 8.4 14.06
Rize 1.91 9.02 3.17 5.87
Artvin 6.41 16.7 10.24 10.97
Regional Average 5.35 15.88 7.27 10.30
National Average 8.18 17.98 8.35 14.17
Sources: http://www.ysk.gov.tr and http://www.belgenet.net.
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This study is concerned with this puzzling contrast between these two groups14
and broaches the following questions: How can we explain the lack of
ethnonationalism among the Laz in Turkey, while the elements of the Kurdish
population have involved in a rather strong ethnonationalist movement against the
state? What lessons can be learned from this case that could be applicable to the
broader theoretical debate on ethnonationalism phenomenon?
This article argues that the existing structural, agential and identity-related
theoretical frameworks remain rather limited in explaining this contrast. As an
alternative approach, this study provides a ‘historicist perspective’. It is shown that
the Laz people experienced an ‘existential threat’ due to the Russian occupation of
their historic homelands in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These
catastrophic events constituted an exogenous shock for the Laz community and
promoted their statist and nationalist (Turkish) orientations and loyalties. Although
the Kurds went through similar calamities as a result of the Russian advance into the
Eastern Anatolia, such a path did not emerge among the Kurds because of tribal
divisions and hostilities. This analysis suggests that certain contingent or stochastic
occurrences at speciﬁc time periods might either exacerbate or stiﬂe ethnonationalist
tendencies within an ethnic group. It is concluded that ‘history’ also matters in the
ethnonationalist processes. Therefore, the path dependent approach, in particular its
ideational version, appears to be rather useful in enhancing our apprehension of the
ethnonationalism phenomenon.
The article proceeds as follows. The following section brieﬂy presents the main
premises of various theoretical accounts on the sources of ethnonationalism and
addresses the extent to which these explanations shed light on the puzzling
divergence between the Laz and Kurds in Turkey. The article then presents an
alternative approach and suggests that the idea of path dependence might be more
helpful in our eﬀorts to comprehend ethnonationalist processes. The subsequent part
applies these arguments to the Laz case. The concluding section restates the main
arguments of the study and presents some implications for broader theoretical
debate on the ethnonationalism phenomenon.
In the last few decades, ethnic and religious tensions have constituted the most
salient source of conﬂict around the world. Parallel to this, the scholarly community
has paid increasing attention to the various aspects of ethnonationalism. The
growing literature emphasizes the role of various structures – institutional, political
or economic – and also agential and identity-related factors as driving forces behind
ethnonationalist ideas and movements. The following section brieﬂy presents the
main premises of some of those theoretical frameworks and addresses the question to
what extent these accounts might be useful in understanding the puzzling diﬀerence
in the degree of ethnonationalist tendencies among the Laz and Kurds in Turkey.
As a structural approach, institutional theory asserts that institutional structures
have autonomous causal impact on observable political outcomes and behaviours.15
From an institutional perspective, one might posit the possibility of state-sponsored
discrimination along group lines as creating this diﬀerence.16 However, this is not
valid in the Turkish case because it is diﬃcult to maintain that the state has been
discriminating against the Kurds while upholding the interests of the Laz people. For
instance, the newly created Republic based on Turkish nationalism oﬃcially forbade
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the designation of Lazistan17 in 1926. The Republic even banned speaking Lazuri in
public places such as schools and changed several Laz place names in the region.18
Another interesting example of state reluctance to recognize Laz identity is that the
government also banned the Lazuri newspaper Mc¸’ita Muruntskhi (Kızıl Yıldız) in
1930.19 Thus, in tandem with similar actions towards the Kurds, the Turkish state
also ignored the linguistic and cultural diﬀerences of the Laz.20
Approaches emphasizing the role of socio-economic structures draw attention to
the impact of socio-economic and material structures such as capitalist development
and modernization processes on ethnopolitical movements. One prevalent argument,
for instance, asserts that ethnonationalism might result from the uneven develop-
ment of capitalist economy, which also refers to relative deprivation theory. For this
theory, the deprivation of a certain group creates disappointment among the
members of that group. This in return leads to resentment, aggression and hostility
vis-a`-vis the perceived aggressor(s) and consequently to ethno-political mobilization
in diﬀerent forms.21 Such an account of ethnonationalism also fails to solve our
puzzle as there is not really a major socio-economic or modernization gap between
these two regions. For instance, Figure 1 provides a comparison of income levels in
the Southeast and East Black Sea regions. As clearly seen, average per capita income
in both of these regions has been below the national average. In other words, both of
these regions constitute economically the least developed parts of Turkey. Despite
this, ethnonationalism is present in one region but not in the other. This fact raises
doubts about the validity of economic approaches in this case. In other words, if
economic underdevelopment triggers ethnonationalist tendencies, then we should
have seen a similar development in the East Black Sea region.
Agential approaches, on the other hand, highlight the role of human agency in the
rise of ethno-nationalist movements. One theoretical orientation within this
approach is elite analysis, which postulates that elite interaction and struggle for
power plays a signiﬁcant role in ethnic mobilization. For instance, Brass professes
that:
ethnicity and nationalism are not ‘givens’, but are social and political
constructions. They are creations of elites, who draw upon, distort, and
Figure 1. A comparison of income levels (per capita income, ppp) in the East Black Sea and
Southeast regions of Turkey. Turkish Statistical Institution (http://www.tuik.gov.tr).
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sometimes fabricate materials from the cultures of the groups they wish to
represent in order to protect their well-being or existence or to gain political and
economic advantage for their groups as well as for themselves.22
Similarly, Lecours suggests that elites are ‘not only active in nationalist mobilization
but also in the construction, transformation and politicization of ethnic identities’.23
As political or ethnic entrepreneurs, elites construct and manipulate symbols, myths
or ideas to legitimize their power, to realize their own interests and to compete
with other elites internal or external to their group. Such competition and conﬂict
among political elites are expected to constitute the dynamic force behind
ethnonationalist processes. Thus, for the elite analysis, ethnic identity is not a ﬁxed
or given disposition but something instrumentally invented or constructed by elites
or entrepreneurs motivated by their self-interests.
There are, however, some diﬃculties with such agential accounts. First, these
approaches are criticized for ignoring the cultural and historical roots of ethnic
identity.24 Secondly, and most importantly, we should not assume that elites would
always politicize and mobilize ethnic identities. In other words, it is problematic to
assume that the struggles of elites for power would automatically lead to creation,
transformation and crystallization of ethnic identities. Rather, elites might also be
involved in certain actions or inactions which might depoliticize existing ethnic
identities. This can actually be observed in our case. Although Kurdish political
elites (e.g. the leaders of pro-Kurdish ethnic parties in the 1990s) involved in various
activities of identity construction, interest deﬁnition and politicization and
mobilization of Kurdish ethnic identity,25 we do not see such a tendency among
the Laz leaders and activists. Instead, there is a tendency among the latter toward
Turkish nationalism rather than ethnic particularities. In brief, rather than solving
the problem, agential analyses, emphasizing elite-driven, instrumentalist methods of
identity creation, raise further puzzling questions. Hence, such analyses also remain
triﬂing in our eﬀorts to grasp the contrast between the Laz and Kurds.
In elucidating the surge of nationalist or ethnonationalist tendencies, identity
approaches draw attention to the presence of a distinct group identity or
consciousness constituted by certain objective (e.g. kinship ties or common descent,
language) and/or symbolic or ideational (e.g. norms, values, traditions, symbols)
elements. One orientation within this approach, for instance, treats nationalist or
ethnonationalist activity as a result of ‘historical ethnic identities’, which is regarded
as something ‘primordial’, ‘natural’ and ‘given’, eventually and spontaneously
appearing in political forms. For instance, Connor emphasizes the sense of kinship as
an important driving force behind ethnonationalism. Using his words, ‘the national
bond, because it is based upon belief in common descent, ultimately bifurcates
humanity into ‘‘us’’ and ‘‘them’’’.26 According to Connor, ethnonational identity is
strong and resistant to change because it is based on strong emotional feelings linked
with ethnicity, which has psychological roots in common descent. Thus, an
ethnonational bond is not necessarily conscious and rational but rather subcon-
scious, emotional and psychological.27 Smith likewise rejects the idea that
nationalism might simply be a product of elite creation and manipulation. Instead,
he notes that national identity is based on certain pre-existing myths, memories,
values, symbols and ethnicity (i.e. a given ethnic identity).28
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However, identity-related approaches are also inadequate to explain the
diﬀerences for a very simple reason. If the presence of a distinct group identity
constituted by common descent, language or cultures is the driving force behind
ethnonationalist mobilization, then one would expect to observe the same tendency
among the Laz, who do have strong kinship or linguistic ties. Besides a distinct
language (i.e. Lazuri) and a historic homeland (Lazona or Lazistan), the Laz also
have a distinct culture with particular folk tales, music (performed by tulum and
kemenc¸e), dances (e.g. horon), traditions and values.29 Despite such distinct group
characteristics, ethnonationalist tendencies among the Laz have never manifested
themselves in the history of the Turkish Republic. As anthropologist Hann also
concludes, ‘The Lazi of North-east Turkey have a fairly clear proﬁle as a linguistic
category, but they currently fall well short of mobilization as an ethnic group,
let alone political separatism.’30
Regarding group features, one might further argue that ‘group size’ should also be
taken into account. It is a fact that compared to the Kurds, the Laz constitute a
relatively minor ethnic group inside Turkey. This diﬀerence in group size might
account for the absence of ethnonationalist orientations among the Laz. Having said
that, the size hypothesis remains as inconclusive because several cases across the
world do indicate that not only major groups (e.g. Canada’s Quebec region, 23 per
cent; Sri Lanka’s Tamils, 14 per cent) but also much smaller groups (e.g. Georgia’s
Ossetia 1 per cent; France’s Basque, 0.4 per cent; Russia’s Chechnya 1 per cent) also
involve ethnonationalist or separatist movements.
In brief, none of the possible explanations presented above suﬃciently address the
puzzling divergence between the Laz and Kurds. This study suggests that
ethnonationalism might also emerge out of the constellation of certain stochastic
events at speciﬁc periods of time. In other words, the existence or absence of
ethnonationalism among the members of a certain ethnic group might be due to
some contingent occurrences or non-occurrences at certain historical junctures,
which create self-reinforcing patterns across time (i.e. a path dependent process).
If that is the case, then historicist approaches might be also helpful in our eﬀorts to
grasp the ethnonationalism phenomenon.31 Thus, the following section conducts a
plausibility probe of the impact of historical contingencies on the evolution or
suppression of ethnonationalist tendencies among the members of a particular ethnic
group. It will be shown that ‘historical causation’, which refers to the processes in
which ‘some original ordering moment triggers particular patterns, and the activity is
continuously reproduced even though the original event no longer occurs’,32
provides us a much better understanding of this intriguing contrast.
The notion of path dependence has been quite popular over the last two decades.
Probably because of this, one can detect quite diﬀerent usages and conceptualiza-
tions of this fashionable term. The following, however, is a brief presentation of its
deﬁning features. This approach basically contends that ‘what happened at an
earlier point in time will aﬀect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events
occurring at a later point in time’.33 Thus, it is emphasized that history matters
because ‘where we go next depends not only on where we are now, but also upon
where we have been’.34 This, however, does not mean that any continuity, pattern
or sequence of events constitutes a path dependent process. It is important to
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indicate that paths arise out of some contingent, accidental occurrences, either
initially or at critical junctures/moments that open new paths.35 Such contingent
occurrences are important because, once they take place at a certain point in time,
they have a signiﬁcant and long-standing impact, leading to new sequences of
events or patterns.36
Paths, once emerged, become inﬂexible in the sense that further steps make
shifting from the extant path to another one very diﬃcult.37 Put diﬀerently, once an
equilibrium is reached, this equilibrium maintains itself or locks itself in.38 Although
a path emerges out of stochastic processes, it is reproduced through certain causal
mechanisms. A highly emphasized mechanism of path reproduction (self-reinforce-
ment) is increasing returns (or positive feedback processes). This notion suggests that
when a certain path produces increasing beneﬁts with its continued adoption, this
creates incentives for path maintenance, leading to inertia.39 Pierson, for instance,
states that ‘each step along a particular path produces consequences which make that
path more attractive for the next round’.40 Such positive feedback processes over
time make it more and more challenging to switch to another path or to return to the
initial conditions.
Regarding ‘change’, the general tendency in the path dependent approach is to
treat it as an incremental, evolutionary development (i.e. path following).41
Substantial, revolutionary or path-breaking changes are expected to happen at
critical moments or junctures, which emerge after a long period of continuity.42 At
these branching points, which are usually created by some externally driven events,43
a new path unfolds.
One drawback of the path dependent approach, however, is that its extant
versions are primarily concerned with the eﬃciency or the costs and beneﬁts of the
existing path. In other words, it suﬀers from a materialist bias. The materialist
propensity is rather eminent in its applications in institutional economics.44 As
Greener observes, the application of path dependence in economics is ‘almost
inextricably about increasing returns’,45 which is based on utilitarian cost–beneﬁt
assessments. The disposition to materialist factors and dynamics in the path
dependent approach is not limited to its applications in institutional economics.
One can ﬁnd the same tendency in political studies. For instance, Pierson, who has
provided the most systematic studies of path dependence in political science,
embraces the same materialist ‘increasing returns’ logic in economics and employs it
in political analyses.46 For instance, he suggests that:
In an increasing returns process, the probability of further steps along the same
path increases with each move down that path. This is because the relative
beneﬁts of the current activity compared with other possible options increase
over time. To put it in a diﬀerent way, the costs of exit – of switching to some
previously plausible alternative – rise.47
This constitutes a limitation because non-material factors and considerations
(i.e. ideas, values and legitimacy concerns) might also constitute a path. In other
words, actors may stick to a certain path not because of an expected utility down the
path but primarily because of believing in the appropriateness of certain ideas
and values.48 Thus, path maintenance might be primarily a non-strategic process.
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The main mechanism of self-reinforcement or path reproduction in such ideational
continuities is taken-for-grantedness or legitimation rather than cost–beneﬁt
assessments (i.e. increasing returns), which is also known as ‘cognitive locking’.
For example, in his study of the continuation of the Scandinavian model of the
welfare state, Cox shows that although the Scandinavian model experienced several
reforms in the 1990s, the distinctiveness of the model remained intact due to the
attachment to the ‘idea’ of the ‘Scandinavian model’, which is based on a particular
combination of the values of universality, solidarity and market independence
(decommodiﬁcation).49 This study expects that such cognitive paths should also play
some role in ethnonationalist processes.
Since nationalist and statist tendencies among the Laz are well-known and a lot
has been written on the evolution and persistence of Kurdish ethnonationalism in the
Turkish context, the following section focuses on the stage of path emergence (i.e. the
rise of contrasting orientations between these two groups) rather than path
maintenance or evolution. In other words, by employing ideational version of the
path dependent approach, the following part explicates the emergence of diﬀerent
orientations among Kurdish and Laz people vis-a`-vis the central authority.
As indicated above, the Laz are known as one of the autochthon peoples of the
Caucasus. Living in a region with substantial geopolitical importance, the Laz
communities witnessed decades-long struggles and warfare between the Ottomans
and Russians aimed at the conquest of the Caucasian territories. After putting an
end to the Pontic/Greek Trabzon Kingdom in 1461, the Ottomans also incorporated
a substantial part of the historic Lazistan region (i.e. the south-eastern shore of the
Black Sea, between Trabzon and Batumi) in the late sixteenth century. The Ottoman
advance in the region led to the gradual conversion of Christian Laz people to Islam.
The conversion, which accelerated after 1580, was almost complete by the late
nineteenth century.
On the Russian side, beginning with the reign of Tsar Peter I the Great (1689–
1725), which turned the Russian tsardom into an Empire, the Russian interest in the
southern and Caucasian lands, inhabited mostly by Muslims, increased.50 Although
the Russian inﬂuence over the region declined following the death of Peter I the
Great, Russian expansionist policies towards the Caucasus were revitalized under the
reign of Catherine II the Great (1762–96). For the Russians, the Caucasus was an
ideal base camp from which they could achieve their imperial projects in Asia.51
Thus, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Russians engaged in large-scale
warfare against the Ottoman Empire and Persia for control of the Caucasus.
Following the 1828–29 Ottoman–Russian War, the Russians dominated the majority
of the Caucasus. Finally defeating the Circassian resistance in 1864, the Russians
were able to complete the conquest of most of the Caucasus.
McCarthy, a prominent student of Ottoman history and demography, suggests
that ‘much of Russian expansion was at the cost of Muslim peoples’.52 The Russian
advance in the Caucasus led to the emigration of large numbers of Muslim people
from the region.53 Much of the Muslim population of North Caucasus, Abkhazia
and coastal Georgia, including the Laz, ﬂed or was forced to move to the Ottoman
Empire.54 The Laz people suﬀered even more during and after the 1877–78
Ottoman–Russian War (the 93 War), which was also disastrous for the Ottoman
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Empire. According to the Congress of Berlin (1878), which settled the war and
redrew the Ottoman borders, the South Caucasian region and the large areas of
Lazistan (i.e. Batumi and Artvin) were given to the Russian tsar.55
To tighten its grip over the Caucasian lands, the Russians pursued a policy of
‘Russiﬁcation’ of the Caucasian people. McCarthy, for instance, suggests that:
The seeming intent was to replace Muslim demographic and political
domination in the Caucasus with Christian demographic and Russian political
preponderance as in the Crimea. Their demographic policy had two pillars – the
exodus of Muslims and the immigration of Christian elements, Slavs in the
North Caucasus, Armenians in the South Caucasus and later in Anatolia.56
Those who resisted the Russian conquest or ‘Russiﬁcation’ measures faced poverty,
expulsion or death.57 Thus having suﬀered political, economic and cultural pressures
from the Russians, many Laz and Georgians left their historic homelands and
migrated to Anatolia, especially to provinces in Western Anatolia such as Bursa,
Yalova, Karamu¨rsel, Izmit, Adapazarı and Sapanca.58 For instance, according to
the Ottoman statistics, around 40,000 Laz and Georgians had settled in the Empire
by 1882.59
After controlling the region for almost 40 years, the Russians expanded their
occupation to the rest of the East Black Sea region during the First World War
(1914–18) and invaded the provinces of Rize and Trabzon which led to the second
round of suﬀering and emigration.60 However, following the Bolshevik Revolution
in 1917, the Russian forces had to withdraw from the region and ﬁnally left the area
to the Ottoman-Turkish forces in March 1918.61
The Russian invasion and occupation of a large part of Lazistan for almost four
decades and the associated ‘Russiﬁcation’ measures such as forcing the local people
to migrate to the Anatolian inlands, the deployment of a Christian population in the
region, mass deportations to other parts of Russia such as Siberia or mass atrocities
against civilian populations62 constituted a major trauma for the Laz people.63 The
suﬀerings caused by Russian imperial expansion, however, strengthened the Laz’s
loyalty and attachment to the Ottoman-Turkish state.64 Therefore, by either joining
the voluntary civilian battalions or participating in the regular military forces, the
Laz people sided with the Ottomans and heroically fought against the Russians
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.65 The memories of Russian
presence in the region are still alive in the minds of the people. The local people, for
instance, remember that period as ‘Black times’.66 Furthermore, once occupied
regions still organize ceremonies to celebrate their liberation from occupying
Russian forces. The Laz associations or organizations in Western Anatolia also
commemorate the liberation from foreign occupation by organizing special meetings
and activities during the liberation days of their respective provinces.
However, we see a considerably diﬀerent picture on the Kurdish side. It is a
historical fact that the Kurds, who enjoyed a varying degree of autonomy under
Ottoman rule,67 experienced similar devastations due to occupation by a foreign
power. During the First World War, the Russians, assisted by Armenian nationalists
and rebels, also advanced into Eastern Anatolia and invaded Erzurum, Erzincan,
Mus¸, Van and Bitlis in 1915 and 1916.68 The Ottoman-Turkish forces under the
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leadership of Mustafa Kemal, however, regained Mus¸ and Bitlis provinces, and in
the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution (1917) the Russians also withdrew from
Eastern Anatolia.
Similar to the local people in Lazistan, the Kurds also suﬀered from the Russian
invasion and occupation of a major part of their historic homelands.69 It is,
however, rather striking that the foreign invasion and occupation of Kurdish
regions and the resultant suﬀering did not create a similar patriotic ideational path
among the Kurds. Why not? The answer lies with tribalism, which has constituted
the heart of Kurdish social organization.70 While it is true that many Kurdish tribal
chieftains took sides with the Ottoman-Turkish forces and mobilized their
tribesmen against the Russians and Armenian nationalists in the region, it is also
a fact that several other leading Kurdish tribal chieftains and their followers,
alienated by the Ottoman centralization policies of the nineteenth century, either
cooperated with the Russian forces or deserted in droves from the Ottoman army
during the war.71 Some other Kurdish tribal leaders such as Sayyid Abdulkadir
and Bedirhanis sought to attain British support for Kurdish autonomy or
independence.72
One assumption in the literature is that tribal structures have constituted a major
obstacle to the rise of Kurdish nationalism.73 One might, however, interpret the
historical record diﬀerently. As intermediary actors between the central authority
and local people, Kurdish tribal leaders always played rather political roles not only
in the Ottoman Empire but also in the Republican period.74 For instance, to
maintain their political and economic prerogatives, the tribal chieftains frequently
revolted against the Ottoman policies of centralization throughout the nineteenth
century.75 In the later period, the Kurdish tribal aristocracy involved in relatively
more nationalistic activities.76 For example, in the early decades of the twentieth
century, Kurdish notables formed several pro-Kurdish societies in urban centres
such as the Hewi-Ku¨rt Cemiyeti (Kurdish Hope Society); the Ku¨rdistan Teavu¨n ve
Terakki Cemiyeti (Society for the Mutual Aid and Progress of Kurdistan), the Ku¨rt
_Istiklal Cemiyeti (Society for Kurdish Independence), the Ku¨rdistan Teali Cemiyeti
(Society for the Advancement of Kurdistan) and the Ku¨rt Tes¸kılat-ı _Ic¸timaiye
Cemiyeti (Society for the Kurdish Social Organization). The educated members of
tribal or religious elite also initiated numerous pro-Kurdish periodicals or
newspapers such as Kurdistan (the ﬁrst newspaper in Kurdish), Roja Kurd (Kurdish
Day), Hetawe Kurd (Kurdish Sun), Jin (Woman) and Bangi Kurd (Kurdish Call).77
These pro-Kurdish formations demanded either autonomy or independence for the
Kurds.78 This unprecedented activism organized and led by tribal chieftains (aghas),
notable families and sheikhs abided during the early Republic and led to major
ethnoreligious revolts posing a survival threat for the newly established Turkish state
in the 1920s and 1930s. This trajectory indicates that tribal structures and feuds due
to personal and factional interests might also have created favourable conditions for
the rise of nationalism among the Kurds. While some tribal chieftains remained loyal
to the Sultan/Caliph, others were hostile to those tribes involved in nationalist or
secessionist movements and cooperated with major powers in the region. Using the
words of O¨zoglu, ‘Kurdish notables, or ayan, were the catalyst for social and
political change among the Kurds and played a major role in the emergence and
subsequent development of Kurdish nationalism’.79
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Considering all of the above, the Russian occupation of Lazistan for several
decades constituted a major exogenous shock for the local people. Large groups of
the Laz ﬂed Russian expansion and settled in the western and eastern parts of the
Black Sea and the Marmara region. Experiencing such a calamity, the Laz viewed
the Ottoman-Turkish state as ‘saviour’ and ‘protector’. Consequently, the Laz had
rather patriotic and nationalist feelings and attachments to the Ottoman-Turkish
state. Despite the state’s non-recognition of a separate Laz ethnic identity, this
cognitive path has persisted throughout the Republican era (1923 onwards).
Therefore, the awareness of non-Turkic origins and unprecedented cultural activism
among the Laz in recent decades does not lead to ethnonationalist deﬁance against
the Turkish state within this ethnic group. As Beller-Hann and Hann also observe:
Even though many [Laz] are aware that Greek and other languages were widely
spoken along the Black Sea coast until quite recently, and many can trace their
family origins back to territories that lie outside the present boundaries of the
modern Turkish state, virtually all the residents of Lazistan consider themselves
to be Turks and evaluate this identity positively. They take this identity to a large
extent for granted.80
Thus, the Russian occupation of the region and Russiﬁcation policies in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was an exogenous shock that created a
critical juncture at which a new ideational path (i.e. strong attachments and loyalties
to the Ottoman-Turkish state) emerged within the Laz community. The taken-for-
grantedness of Turkishness or positive approach towards that identity among the
Laz is due to such a ‘cognitive locking’. As a result, the Laz people not only reject
ethnonationalism but also openly denigrate those groups involving in such actions
against the state. Almost all interviewed activists, for instance, forthrightly expressed
their disapproval of Kurdish demands for certain group rights (i.e. education in
Kurdish) or regional autonomy. Such actions are simply considered as ‘inappropri-
ate’ or ‘treacherous’.
On the Kurdish side, however, we see a substantially diﬀerent picture. Interestingly,
the impact of this exogenous shock was conditioned by some endogenous factors
(i.e. tribalism) and led to a diﬀerent outcome. Although the war and migration eﬀect
fostered statist and nationalist (Turkish) orientations and created unfavourable
soil for the seeds of ethnonationalism among the Laz, the prevalence of tribal
divisions and hostilities within Kurdish society prevented the critical juncture from
cultivating a similar pro-state ideational path among the Kurds. Contrary to the Laz,
the Kurds viewed the state as the ‘occupier’ of their land rather than as their
protector. Such an understanding continued during the Republican period. While
the state denial and suppression of diﬀerent ethnic identities accelerated Kurdish
activism and promoted the ethnonationalist path among the Kurds during the
Republican period, the fear of a Pontic state in the East Black Sea region and the
communist Soviet threat reinforced the nationalist/statist path on the Laz side.
In conclusion, the existing structural, agential and identity-related factors have
limited leverage in accounting for the absence of ethnonationalism among the Laz,
while the Kurds have been engaged in a major ethnonationalist challenge against the
280 Z. Sarigil
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ilk
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
8:0
3 2
3 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
4 
Turkish state. This study suggested that solving this puzzle requires a historically
sensitive approach. The Laz people experienced an ‘existential threat’ due to the
Russian invasion and occupation of their historical homelands in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. These catastrophic events nourished statist and nationalist
(Turkish) orientations among the Laz. In other words, relatively stronger patriotic
orientations within the Laz community emerged at a particular historical juncture
and then reproduced itself over time. Similar experience and suﬀering due to Russian
advances into Eastern Anatolia did not generate a similar patriotic path among the
Kurds because this exogenous trigger interacted with an endogenous factor (i.e.
tribal divisions and hostilities) and led to a totally diﬀerent outcome.
Regarding broader implications, given the likelihood that past events and
memories should constitute an important place in the formation of ethnic
consciousness and identity, it becomes surprising that extant theoretical frameworks
make short shrift of ‘contingent historical conditions’ as opposed to ‘constant’
causes in the analyses of ethnonationalist processes. This study indicates that certain
contingent, accidental occurrences at certain points in time might either promote or
quell ethnonationalist tendencies. Thus, ‘history’ also matters in ethnonationalist
processes in the sense that contingent occurrences or non-occurrences might have
a long-lasting impact on ethnic consciousness. This ﬁnding denotes that path
dependence, especially its ideational version sensitive to cognitive locking processes,
would be a valuable tool to employ in studies of ethnonationalism. The research
results ﬁnally imply that the phenomena of ethnicity and ethnonationalism might
also appear as elastic, contingent and constructed rather than as essential or
primordial.
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Appendix: A List of Interviewees
Aytekin Locumcu, Laz Ku¨ltu¨r ve Dayanıs¸ma Dernegi (Laz Cultural and Solidarity
Association), Ankara, July 2009.
Gu¨lay Burhan, the Chairperson of Sima Dogu Karadenizliler Hizmek Vakfı (Sima
Foundation for People from East Black Sea Region), Izmit, July 2009.
Gu¨rbu¨z Akyu¨z, the Chairperson of Artvin Ku¨ltu¨r ve Yardımlas¸ma Dernegi (the
Artvin Cultural and Solidarity Association), Ankara, July 2009.
Halim C¸apan, the Chairperson of Hopalılar Dernegi (the Association of People from
Hopa), Istanbul, July 2009.
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